The Trickle-Down of Corruption: Italy, Mafia, and the Crisis of Legality by Armao, Fabio
 1 
Armao, Fabio. 2018. The Trickle-Down of Corruption: Italy, Mafia, and the Crisis of 
Legality, in Italy From Crisis to Crisis. Political Economy, Security, and Society in the 21st 
Century, Matthew Evangelista, ed. London: Routledge, 83-102. 
 
Introduction: The Italian Anomaly 
Italy is a borderline country, teetering permanently on the brink of disaster in conditions of 
stable instability, battered by continuous crises that mostly originate in the political system to 
infiltrate the now dysfunctional economic and social environments. The unification of Italy 
occurred more than 150 years ago, yet the country never developed a coherent and fully-
integrated sense of its own identity. On the contrary, the country is composed of 
contradictory – and sometimes totally incompatible – models of politics and economic 
development, as well as controversial life-styles. Undoubtedly, this is not a genetic 
shortcoming specific to Italians, but a product of a convoluted political past. 
First, the present lack of identity is a consequence of the ineptitude of the elite who ruled 
the state-making process, selling a coherent and unitary image of themselves to the 
communities they pretended to include in the newborn kingdom – it is enough to remember 
the conflicting political attitudes of Cavour and Garibaldi (Macry 2012; Lupo 2011). The 
consequence was an incapacity to nourish the very idea of citizenship. This was further 
reinforced by a decision implemented by the unitary governments to co-opt rather than coerce 
the pre-existing southern Italian power elite in the Mezzogiorno and particularly in Sicily, 
which actually supported the survival of autonomous power centers equipped with means of 
coercion (Tilly, 2007). As a result, “the unification process, and the way the House of Savoy 
managed the first years of the new kingdom, emphasized the relevance and the power of 
organized crime groups, which ended up reinforced instead of defeated” (Felice 2013, 61). 
Second, the Italian anomaly is a by-product of the solutions adopted by the power elite 
after the ruinous experiences of the two World Wars and the authoritarian fascist interlude to 
try to solve the original fault in the state-making process. In his opening chapter of La crisi 
italiana, Sidney Tarrow, debating the Italian crisis of the 1970s, concluded that, despite its 
serious, multiform, and still unfinished character, the crisis came under the control of the 
power elite: “the politicalization of the crisis and the fragmented response are an attempt to 
prevent an organic crisis of the system” (Tarrow 1979, 37). This is absolutely true: Italy is a 
country based on the “hegemony of the political society,” or rather a country lacking a 
capacity of collective mobilization, in which the political society “tends to monopolize the 
arena of the exchanges and places itself at the center as a mediator” between state and civil 
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society; political society asserts “its own hegemony as the hegemony of intermediaries” 
(Farneti 1994, 25 and 26). In the case of political hegemony, “the appropriation of power and 
work is monopolistically implemented by the political society through a series of blatant 
appropriations, such as the spoils system, for example; or through latent appropriations 
usually implemented by corruption, cronyism, and so on” (Farneti 1994, 28). From the end of 
World War II, it was the politicians in Italy who developed specific skills of illegality, 
successfully involving increasing numbers of people from the civil society. This means the 
political elite bears the main responsibility for the ongoing crisis, even if ultimately they 
share it with elements of both the economic and social elites and the broader civil society: 
“Civil society, far from being subjugated by an all-embracing political class, has been 
successfully coopted into a system of common interests which has turned most Italians, 
whether consciously or not, into accomplices of the system” – as well as with the mafia, one 
of its most efficient partners (Guzzini 1995, 32). 
The evolution of the Italian political system led to the current crisis, a crisis that eventually 
proved to be foundational more than simply organic: it is a crisis of legality so radical that it 
is rocking the very core of Italian democracy. Every day in Italy, the news carries additional 
evidence of this unprecedented crisis, pointing out a widespread indifference to laws and to 
punishments among growing numbers of individuals. This has been observed to such a great 
degree that we can assume that the laws are no longer part of their everyday lives.1 In this 
sense, the crisis of legality foreshadows the questioning of the very foundations of 
legitimacy, or the belief in the validity of the legal power. But that’s not all. In Italy, the 
“normal” pathologies of cronyism and corruption that are widespread in other democratic 
countries are transformed into something completely different because of the proliferation of 
mafias. The main influencing factor is that criminal organizations in Italy manage 
considerable resources of violence and money that are largely unknown (under this form and 
in such severity) in other developed countries. The current Italian crisis, therefore, is 
foundational not only because of the arbitrary illegal) character of power, but also because of 
the proliferation of de facto (illegitimate) powers, the mafias.2 
We must further assume that in order to explain the current crisis of legality it is necessary 
to retell Italian history, combining different narratives which social scientists tend to separate 
– in particular, as they distinguish the evolution of mafia from that of the political and 
economic systems or offer an idiosyncratic representation of their relationships. The first 
section offers a brief interpretation of the period of Italian socio-political turmoil known as 
the Years of Lead as the early warning symptom of what has been defined from time to time 
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as the Italian collapse (Crainz 2015), the beginning of the bronze age (Felice 2015, 301) or, 
more bluntly, the Italian disaster (Anderson 2014). The second builds on the combined 
effects of the assassinations of the prosecutors Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino in 
Palermo and the Bribesville (Tangentopoli) scandal in Milan – but there is no guarantee there 
will be any empirical correlation between the two events. The third outlines the main traits of 
mafia expansion at home and beyond their territories of origin. The fourth investigates the 
peculiarities of mafia colonization of Central and Northern Italy, and the flywheel role they 
assumed in trickling down corruption. Finally, the conclusion offers Italy as a paradigm of 
“real existing democracy” (in the same way as we had “real existing socialism” during the 
Cold War). 
 
Retelling the Story of the Years of Lead 
All the sources tend to correlate the Years of Lead story strictly with terrorism, be it in 
Italy or West Germany, but this narrative does not fit the Italian situation perfectly. Between 
1970 and 1993, the mafia murdered 612 civilians and representatives of the Institutions, 
whereas left- and right-wing terrorism were responsible for 181 deaths, and what were called 
“state massacres” caused a further 129 fatalities.3 The mafia killed 70 members of law 
enforcement agencies (the terrorists killed 105), 17 judges (terrorists 11), and 14 politicians 
(terrorists one, Prime Minister Aldo Moro).4 It is worth noting that such an extreme level of 
violence has no comparison in Europe. Several other countries were affected by the problem 
of terrorism over that same period; however, none of them were simultaneously faced with 
the violence of terrorism and of organized crime.5 The point is that the Sicilian Cosa Nostra 
was killing more people than all of the other organized crime and terrorist groups combined. 
And if we take a closer look at the killings, what emerges is the extremely precise targeting of 
their victims: investigators, prosecutors, journalists, entrepreneurs, politicians – not chosen 
for their symbolic value, for what they represent (contrary to terrorism) but for who they are: 
individual enemies of the clans, antagonists or resisters in the mafia’s territorial wars. 
On May 9, 1978, while the Red Brigade was leaving the body of Aldo Moro in Via 
Caetani, in Rome, the apex of terrorist strategy, mafia members planted a bomb that executed 
Giuseppe Impastato, a political and anti-mafia activist, in Cinisi (Palermo), in an attempt to 
validate the lie that he was a terrorist preparing an attack. In 1979 the Cosa Nostra killed, 
among others, Michele Reina (Provincial Secretary of the Christian Democratic Party) and 
Cesare Terranova (member of the Court of Appeal in Palermo, and former member of the 
Parliament for the Communist Party and of the Anti-mafia Parliamentary Commission). In 
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1980, Piersanti Mattarella (Christian Democrat, president of the Sicilian Region) and Gaetano 
Costa (Chief Prosecutor in Palermo) met the same fate, as did Pio La Torre (member of the 
Parliament for the Communist Party and of the Antimafia Parliamentary Commission, and 
then Regional Secretary of the Communist Party) and Carlo Alberto Dalla Chiesa (General of 
the Carabinieri, founder of the anti-terrorism special corps, and Prefect in Palermo for less 
than four months)6 in 1982. This list is not intended for comparative purposes, or to produce a 
ranking of importance of the victims; it has been compiled simply to suggest that social 
scientists should revisit the story of the Italian Years of Lead. 
Terrorism has been tellingly defined as an “insurgency symptomatic of a blocked 
situation,” the reaction to a political stalemate, to a political system unable to innovate 
(Bonanate 1979, 176; Manconi 2008). This is the perfect description of the Italian situation – 
a product of both international and domestic factors, from the role Italy played in Cold War 
strategies to the inability of the country’s successive governments – despite the expansion of 
the left, highlighted by the election of the country’s first Socialist Prime Minister (Bettino 
Craxi, 1983) – to regulate and govern the ongoing dramatic social and economic 
transformations (Ginsborg 2003, ch. 5). We should not forget that from the end of the 1960s, 
Italy and other European countries were facing a new and growing wave of contention 
between new political movements and the old party system (Tarrow, in this volume). But 
beyond that, the “Italian miracle” had already expired (Felice 2015, ch. 6; Battilani and Fauri 
2014, ch. 4) dramatically reducing the competitiveness of Italian industries in an international 
setting dominated by the first global oil crisis and the simultaneous structural changes 
induced in the international financial markets marked by the end of the Bretton Woods 
System (see the chapters in this volume by Bini and Hopkin and Lynch). This resulted in the 
free circulation of currencies, which deprived central banks and international monetary 
authorities of any residual powers of control, in the privatization of credit, and in the 
proliferation of offshore financial centers (Gilpin 1987; Strange 1986). 
In this global scenario, mafias in Italy played a role similar to the terrorist groups: they, 
too, used violence in attempts to unlock the political stalemate, answer the political and 
economic interests of private groups, and mobilize the masses against the government. 
Investigations revealed that at times mafia interests converged with the interests of neo-
fascist groups and disloyal sectors of the state apparatus; but in this case the aim was to foster 
a transition to authoritarianism, manipulating the citizens’ consent through panic.7 It is 
beyond the scope of this essay to summarize the events of those decades, most of which are 
still to be fully unravelled, and we are still waiting for the government to publish the relevant 
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classified documents. However, it is at least worth remembering the archetypal narrative of 
the 1970s and the 1980s in the matter of the secret Masonic Lodge “Propaganda 2,” ruled by 
Licio Gelli; it managed to form a very effective and well-structured network of politicians, 
members of the armed forces and secret services, and the financial lobbies. And within this 
narrative, the bankers Michele Sindona and Roberto Calvi both played a role. Their stories 
were closely intertwined, involving the same political milieu, the same Vatican Bank, the 
mafia, and suicide – the first in an Italian jail, with cyanide, on March 22, 1986; the second, 
by hanging under the Blackfriars Bridge in London on June 17, 1982 (Silj 1994, 331ff; 
Crainz 2005, 491ff). Sindona, in particular, was a real precursor of an upcoming generation 
of financial executives, and he tested every opportunity offered by the post-Bretton Woods 
financial market, speculating both in Italy and the United States, locating easy hospitality for 
his illicit gains in various international tax havens. He proved to be an incomparable 
wildcatter, openly endorsing his powerful political and economic friendships, unscrupulous in 
menacing his opponents and using violence if he felt it necessary. He commissioned the 
American mafia to kill Giorgio Ambrosoli, a liquidator in charge of Sindona’s bank; 
Ambrosoli was gunned down in Milan on July 11, 1979 (Stajano 1991). Sindona personifies 
an overly common way of conceiving politics and economy in the Italian First Republic, and 
a symptom of an even worse disease to come. 
 
1992, Building On the Palermo-Milan Nexus 
The year 1992 marked a critical juncture in Italian history, in which two heavy and 
prolonged conflicts, or cleavages, converged (Rokkan 1999, 278ff). The first concerned the 
evolution of the mafia system, with particular regard to the Sicilian Cosa Nostra. Decades of 
a well-planned strategy of violence culminated in two explosions in Palermo: on May 23, 
Giovanni Falcone was killed with his wife Francesca Morvillo and three police officers; on 
July 19, Paolo Borsellino and five police officers suffered the same fate. Investigators, 
politicians, intellectuals, and citizens all joined in the debate on the causes of and 
responsibility for these events, but devoted considerably less attention to their consequences. 
Some of the major Cosa Nostra bosses were arrested over the following months and years, 
and every now and then there would be discussions on who had ultimately won the war – the 
mafia or the state? And yet this was not the appropriate question.8 
Social scientists, in particular, should have been questioning the outcomes in terms of the 
consequences for the mafia organizations, and for the relationships between mafia and both 
the political system and the civil society. From this perspective, the main result of the 1992 
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cleavage was that the mafia groups opted for a different strategy that implied a lesser use of 
explicit violence and a more nuanced variety of dissuasive-corruptive-collusive-clientelistic 
relationships, depending on the interests involved, and the setting of these relationships. 
Paradoxically, this evolution was reinforced by the second cleavage Italy experienced in 
1992: namely, Bribesville and the subsequent end of the First Republic.9 In the 25 months 
following February 17, 1992 – the date of the first incarceration in Milan – more than 4,500 
individuals were arrested, and around 25,400 more received a notice of investigation. 
Approximately 1,100 members of the Parliament and politicians were involved, investigated, 
or jailed (Diamanti 2008). We agree that “once the parties that had been in power collapsed, 
an enormous void was left at the center of the Italian political system” (Crainz 2015, 179), 
and this collapse benefitted new parties like the Northern League, and, particularly, 
Berlusconi’s Forza Italia, successful thanks to the peculiarly attractive (albeit ambiguous) 
charisma of its leader, Silvio Berlusconi. However, we should add two more considerations. 
The first is that the Italian political system also collapsed so abruptly because the old mass-
based parties had already began to lose their legitimation with the end of the Cold War. This 
is also the reason why “the [1992] crisis went well beyond the overturning of the political 
class: more overtly than in the crisis of the late 1960s, it involved a growing sentiment of 
antipolitica, a preference for direct, as opposed to representative forms of participation” 
(Tarrow, this volume). The fact is that the “end of ideologies,” perceived as a liberation in the 
Italian political debate, also left a desert devoid of ideas and of coherent political projects. 
This also produced successive waves of populism, emotional (and often unpredictable) 
electoral exits, and the proliferation of leaders who attempted to be charismatic, and enforced 
their political programs through armies of ghost writers and spin doctors, whose task, by 
definition, was not to produce “great thoughts” but “great words” – and, when necessary, 
were also “professionals in lying” (Arendt 1972). 
The second consideration is that Bribesville also had the effect of destroying the old 
networks of illegal political financing and corruption; however, there was no action 
addressing the structural causes of these phenomena, nor was this ever a job for the judicial 
powers. Corruption still dramatically increased instead of dropping. The new political system 
was not totally dormant: “In less than two decades, three anti-corruption agencies have been 
established, two major transparency initiatives have been launched, two codes of conduct for 
public personnel have been introduced, the incompatibility regime has been reviewed twice” 
(Piccio, Di Mascio and Natalini 2014, 189). However, this gives the impression of reactions 
and counter-reactions rather than a coherent and consistent anti-corruption reform program. 
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The overall pattern observed with respect to the Italian governments’ disposition towards 
anti-corruption policy reforms since the 1990s is one of incremental change: policy changes 
have been developed occasionally and unevenly, disguised as substantial continuity yet 
lacking effective implementation (ibid.) 
The new political system still had the problem of recruiting its members and financing 
their activities, with the growing relevance of private media raising the cost of campaigning; 
and this occurred beyond any real judicial or social control. While prior to 1992 corruption 
was one of the main financial resources for political party activities and their top leaders on a 
national level, at this point private accumulation of wealth became the main motivation for 
corruption. Misappropriation of public funds was spreading in local governments, too, 
shifting the practice of corruption from “stealing for the party” to “stealing the party” (Crainz 
2015, 184). In spite of the surge of moral shame from the media and public opinion, in the 
private sphere the moral cost of corruption seemed to decrease further. The diffusion of mafia 
subcultures forcefully preached estrangement from the state and from the law – so much so 
that Bribesville rapidly proved to be a “squandered opportunity” (Della Porta and Vannucci 
1999). 
The year 1992 is mostly (and  accurately) remembered as the year of the Maastricht Treaty 
and progress in European unification. We should not forget, however, that for Italy it marked 
the beginning of a growing devaluation of the Lira, which would lose 40 percent of its value 
against the US Dollar and the German Mark over three years, producing a currency storm and 
Italy’s withdrawal from the European Monetary System (Graziani 2000). To meet the targets 
of joining the Euro system, between 1992 and 1998 successive governments were forced to 
drain huge financial resources, further reducing the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 
cutting investments in the principle fields of research, innovation, and education (Felice 
2015). During that period, the most dynamic components of the modern Italian economy 
were operating as a fourth type of capitalism (based mainly on the model of the industrial 
districts); but they had to share the market with criminal enterprises – namely Cosa Nostra, 
Camorra, and ’Ndrangheta – which dramatically increased their revenues and spilled out to 
the other regions of the country from their home bases in southern Italy (Amatori 2011). 
If we go back briefly to the Years of Lead, we can now see that, while terrorism was 
losing most of its allure as a reaction to a stagnant situation, the mafia by contrast proved to 
be an effective enabler, offering an exit route for the political and economic stalemate. 
Moreover, “upturning a liberalist metaphor, we could say that the [Italian] elite has not 
promoted a ‘trickling down’ process whereby wealth is distributed across the country, but has 
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encouraged a process in which what actually ‘trickles down’ is illegality” (Ruggiero 2012, 
157). The effects of the two cleavages finally accumulate to welcome the mafias wherever 
political and economic collusive relationships already exist, increasing the particularistic 
appropriation of collective resources (Sciarrone 2014). 
 
Criminal Clusters at Home and Abroad 
First of all, corruption represents a sort of highway offered to mafia clans to facilitate their 
spread in Northern Italy (Dalla Chiesa 2015). Secondly, corruption takes root first and 
foremost in the public works sector, where cartels form frequently, and legitimate 
entrepreneurs, professionals, white collar criminals, and members of mafia clans are all 
involved (Ruggiero 2012). In recent years, when comparing a growing number of case 
studies, social scientists have investigated why and how mafia clans move. We have observed 
the proliferation of different, and sometimes contrasting, paradigms which aimed to shed 
light on the shifts and patterns in the mobility of organized crime groups outside of their 
territories of origin – for example, a wide range of push and pull factors were identified, 
forces which drive these groups from or to a specific setting (Morselli, Turcotte and Tenti, 
2011). 
Most of these contributions were built on the main assumption, first stated by Gambetta 
(1993), that mafias are illegal economic enterprises involved in the production, promotion, 
and sale of private protection (Varese 2011a, 2011b; Campana 2011; Vannucci 2015). 
Considerable empirical evidence suggests, however, that mafias, more than any other type of 
organized crime, are much more than ordinary protection enterprises. For one thing, they can 
count on a significant and durable amount of social capital (Sciarrone 2009). For another, 
their organizational forms are unusually flexible: “in real circumstances, different levels of 
action and organization may coexist and combine. Territorial expansion processes may 
involve individuals, groups or organizations; and they may mainly pursue an economic mode 
and follow the logic of affairs, or the organizational mode that favours the logic of 
membership” (Sciarrone 2014, 33). 
At this point, we aim to enrich this perspective, with some points that should better explain 
the ongoing foundational crisis of Italian legality: 
1. In their territories of origin, mafias develop as organizations consisting of different clans; 
they are more or less hierarchically structured to balance their need for authority (almost 
always protected by secrecy) without having to give up on a network, and can adapt easily to 
different needs. Mafias pursue profits through monopolistic positions in illicit markets and 
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make instrumental use of legitimate markets, primarily for covert activities and money 
laundering. Finally, mafias achieve their position of control by using violence as a specific, 
though not exclusive, means for acquiring political power (Armao 2000). 
2. The clan is the main unit of analysis and is defined as a group that aims to unite and 
safeguard the interests and security of its members, based on a subjective notion of identity 
and belonging, more than the objective reality of kinship identified as the existence of family 
or blood connections.10 The limits of a clan are defined by its own claims of identity, which 
must be confirmed within the social context through a process of affirmation and verification 
of its own legitimacy, and, in the final analysis, by the clan’s capacity to command the 
obedience of its own members. Territory is the main factor in clan coalescence, and it 
depends in no small part on shared living conditions and subcultures (Armao 2015). 
3. Clans combine the idea of local dominion with the globalizing logic of colonization of 
new domains beyond the borders of their home territories. This development model translates 
into a process characterized by alternating phases of entrenchment and expansion: the clan 
takes shape in a specific territorial context, but once its power has been consolidated, it looks 
to establish new settlements; preferably it will expand initially into adjacent regions, and then 
into different countries or even other continents. Both of these phases may be further 
subdivided into two additional stages: a) entrenchment (territorial conquest through violence 
and/or consensus); and b) expansion (projection of power through commercial colonization 
and/or settlement colonization). 
4. Clans increasingly tend to structure themselves like clusters of integrated and 
geographically proximate companies, interconnected by a variety of externalities, and 
classifiable according to two variables: a) degree of clustering and b) life cycle. On the basis 
of the degree of clustering, it is possible to distinguish between pure agglomerations, social 
networks and political complexes, depending primarily on the existence or not of 
prerequisites for admission and the pretense of exclusive membership, as well as the 
prevailing attitude of trust or opportunism among the members. On the basis of the life cycle, 
we can distinguish between four phases: a) latency, or the presence in a specific territory of 
favorable conditions, such as a large reservoir for the recruitment of new members, and 
political and economic players eager to take advantage of the opportunities created by the 
clan; b) development, or the moment in which a clan legitimizes its claim to power (if 
necessary by dissuading, or effectively using violence against competitors); c) 
institutionalization, or the consolidation of both the financial resources and the relationships 
with other political and economic players; and d) transformation, or the capability to comply 
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with evolving market demands and governing strategies. In everyday life, investigations may 
discover cases that combine elements from different ideal types, as well as clans in transition 
with regard to their degree of clustering or life cycle. It is essential to add, however, that no 
single one of these types is necessarily better or more powerful and reliable than the others. 
The highly institutionalized political complex, for example, is not necessarily the most cost-
effective. The winning strategy in this game is one which, case-by-case, reveals itself to be 
most compatible with input received from the surrounding environment, in an endless game 
of action and reaction, and reciprocal influence. This also means, finally, that clans may 
enforce different types of cluster models at home and in the areas of new settlement, 
depending on the different political, economic and even cultural environment, specific to that 
territory (Armao 2014). Figure 1 is a tentative representation of the distribution of clans, 
based on the degree of clustering and life cycle. 
 
 
Fig. 1: Distribution of clans based on the degree of clustering and life cycle 
 
The power of the clans, the reason they can be so effective in transplanting beyond their 
territories of origin, is based exactly on their capability to interact with the social 
environment. This networking activity, ranging from intimidation to flattery, tends to 
 11 
generate a grey area of relationships whose borders are difficult to trace, yet they exist with 
actors who are not all equal. We propose to identify these actors on the basis of the options – 
exit, voice, and loyalty – that the clans make available to them: respectively, the possibility of 
shifting from that clan to other groups in the arena, of stating one’s own opinion (or 
dissatisfaction) in order to change the practices of the clan, of proclaiming one’s loyalty as a 
way of demonstrating compliance to the will of the boss, and as a means of increasing one’s 
influence over the leadership (Hirschman 1970).11 We may therefore distinguish four 
different types of subjects: 
 
 
Fig. 2: The quadrant of clan relationships 
 
1. Escaping subjects: individuals who do not possess any relevant benefit for the clan and 
who, therefore, are not even asked to join. The appearance of a clan on their territory, 
however, will not prompt them to resist or seek an alternative authority, such as the state – in 
fact, these are both risky undertakings that might provoke the revenge of the mafiosi. Their 
acquiescence relegates them to a condition that they pretend not to see and not to know. For 
these individuals, the exit strategy, which means abandoning the territory, is always an 
available option, but they will have no chance of requesting favours from the clans, nor will 
they have the opportunity to reinforce their voice by proclaiming a loyalty which is not even 
asked of them. 
2. Subordinate subjects: individuals who hold offices or possess skills and resources relevant 
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to the clan’s requirements. The clan subjects these people to its full coercive power, and does 
not allow them to escape the subjugation nor soften the effects by allowing them to use their 
own voice. Paradoxically, these subjects have no choice but to profess their loyalty to a 
culture and values they do not necessarily share, in the hope of obtaining the clan’s 
protection. 
3. Colluding subjects: individuals who create mutually convenient relationships with the clan 
aimed at satisfying common interests. For both actors, these relationships assume a fully 
utilitarian nature thanks to the fact that the colluded individual knows that he or she possesses 
resources which are essential to the clan; while the clans know that they can compel the 
colluded individual into maintaining or even increasing those resources over time. The 
bargaining power of colluding subjects allows them to overtly demonstrate any potential 
dissatisfaction with the clan, as well as preserve the exit option, if only as a coercive measure. 
Loyalty, on the other hand, has little relevance in a relationship pragmatically devoted to 
achieving the maximum conceivable benefit for both parties involved. 
4. Criminal subjects: individuals who totally comply with the clan, even though they are not 
effective members. These individuals represent a fifth column in civil society, and their main 
task is to increase the level of consent. Loyalty remains the basis for their action; voice is 
ancillary to it and used only when needed to defend the clan’s interests – which helps explain 
why most of the time criminal subjects cannot even conceive, let alone implement, an exit 
strategy from their chosen affiliation. 
Empirical research should strive to classify the various subjects living in a given clan-ruled 
territory according to the four quadrant categories, and test the clan’s ability to appropriately 
(and rationally) perform the following three options: a) provide an exit for those who either 
do not matter, or matter too much, and not to those for whom the clan has the greatest need; 
b) give voice to the true believers and those who have resources, and not to those who have 
no other choice than to submit; c) forgo loyalty in peer relationships and appeal to it to fuel 
the voices of the supporters and ensure the silence of those who are afraid. On the other hand, 
this grid could become an instrument by which the degree of responsibility of the subjects 
interacting with the clan is measured. However, we must bear in mind the fact that escaping 
and colluding subjects have more freedom of choice than subordinated and criminal subjects. 
Lest this fourfold typology appear too abstract or academic, it is worth noting that it reflects 
the way some Italian legal authorities have come to understand the situation. In a recent trial, 
an entrepreneur from Brianza was sentenced to 12 years in prison, convicted of colluding 
with ’Ndrangheta, rather than being a victim (subordinate subject). The court, in fact, stated 
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that “the difference with the victimized entrepreneur is that he suffers the violence of the 
group, without gaining any benefit; the colluded entrepreneur, on the other hand, makes the 
decision to live with the imposition he suffers, exploiting it to get closer to the criminal 
organization and receive personal advantage” (Rossi 2015, 47). Further evidence of the value 
of these categories comes from studying the geographic expansion of the mafia since the 
early 1990s. 
 
The Colonization of Central and Northern Italy 
We saw in the second section that the two cleavages of 1992 finally merged to allow 
mafias to earn a role as main enablers in both political and economic environments. In other 
words, clans can take advantage of the consequences the crisis of the old party system had on 
corruption: “if corruption of the first Bribesville was frequently organized by way of the 
hidden structure of political parties, managed by party treasurers and business politicians, the 
corruption that results from recent investigations adjusts itself to the reduced managing 
capability of a corrupted political machine” (Della Porta, Sberna and Vannucci 2015, 216, 
italics added). If corruption is nurtured by the very existence of hidden spaces – spaces 
concealed from the control of law enforcement agencies – then mafia clans can count on the 
further competitive advantage of being used to secrecy, which is essential to protect its 
affiliates and guarantee the group against the risks of enemy infiltration. This specific attitude 
makes them particularly attractive for what we defined as the colluding subjects – political or 
economic actors eager to win votes and profits in blatant disregard of legal norms and to hide 
their malpractices. 
Among the different Italian mafia brands, in recent decades ’Ndrangheta has proved to be 
the most effective in colonizing new territories in Central and Northern Italy, where its hold 
clearly prevails. This is the result of many factors: historical events, different patterns of 
organization and diffusion, the geography of migration. The seemingly reduced role of the 
Sicilian mafia, for example, could be ascribed to the events of 1992, and specifically to the 
consequences the events had on Cosa Nostra. And yet we should not forget Sindona and 
Calvi, and the evidence that Cosa Nostra had been playing a financial role in Milan since the 
1960s. This could support the hypothesis that the Sicilian mafia is still heavily devoted to 
financial strategies, such as money laundering and recycling of illicit profits that are much 
more difficult to investigate and result in prosecution. The Neapolitan Camorra, on the other 
hand, may pay a heavy price for the crushing infighting among its clans, indicating an 
inability to guarantee stability through a clear and legitimate hierarchy. In spite of the 
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propensity of its members to follow an entrepreneurial strategy, the Camorra clans actively 
operate in the Lazio, Emilia Romagna, Tuscany, Lombardy and Veneto regions (Sciarrone 
2014; CROSS 2015c). In both of these cases, relative to the Cosa Nostra and Camorra, we 
can assume that they are moving along the axis shown in Figure 1, at the intersection between 
pure agglomeration and social network, on one side, and between development and 
institutionalization, on the other. 
Assuming that all these organizations do not hesitate to threaten people or use violence to 
gain power, ’Ndrangheta seems to better embody the characteristics that provide the winning 
options under present circumstances: a fully-fledged awareness of the settlement territory; a 
well-structured and hierarchical organization, governed by drawing on the symbols and the 
subcultures needed to reinforce its internal cohesion; the will to exploit ethnic bonds at 
village level, moving to territories where the clan members can easily recreate kin 
relationships and emphasize the risk of moral shame to prevent treachery (Ciconte 1992, 
2010). Finally, in the Northwest ’Ndrangheta adopted a strategy to colonize small 
municipalities, especially in the suburbs of Milan or Turin; it was well aware that in such 
districts it is easier to appeal to ethnic bonds, and to win the control of elections by selling 
votes to colluding candidates, and elude the investigations of law enforcement agencies and 
the media (Dalla Chiesa 2015).12 This means that ’Ndrangheta is capable, when needed, of 
reproducing the intensity of a political complex in small enclaves even at a local level, far 
from their home territories. 
A simple list of the results of the investigations, collected periodically in institutional 
reports, is quite impressive. Mafias in Northern Italy are involved in all of the traditional 
illicit activities: narco-trafficking, extortion, loan-sharking, counterfeiting, gambling, 
prostitution, and so on (CROSS 2015c). Moving to the legal economy, in recent years, the 
mafias were involved in sectors ranging from construction and public contracts to public and 
private healthcare systems, from large-scale retail trade to tourism and commerce in the 
following regions: Emilia Romagna, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Lazio, Liguria, Lombardy, 
Piedmont, Tuscany, Trentino-Alto Adige, Val d’Aosta, Veneto (CROSS 2015b; Sciarrone 
2014). Six city councils were dissolved, charged with infiltration by the mafia: Bardonecchia, 
Leinì, Rivarolo Canavese (Turin, Piedmont); Sedriano (Milan, Lombardy); Bordighera 
(revoked in 2013), and Ventimiglia (Imperia, Liguria). 
We could give several examples of investigations, and quote numerous trial sentences to 
support these data.13 However, the case studies that best fit the hypothesis that the current 
foundational crisis of legality is simply the product of new corruption and mafia interests are 
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those related to major infrastructure projects. The first case in point is the scandal related to 
MoSE (Modulo Sperimentale Elettromeccanico) – an integrated system consisting of rows of 
mobile gates designed to protect Venice from flooding. Two different waves of 
investigations, in 2013 and 2014, revealed a network of systemic corruption, dating back to 
1984 (even surviving Bribesville): a maze of private enterprises formed a consortium and 
corrupted the monitoring authorities, lobbying at both the local and national levels, illicitly 
financing political parties and urging the media to foster public acquiescence to a 
technologically and economically controversial project. The MoSE epitomizes a new model 
for the “privatization of public decisions,” conceived to bypass any form of control with the 
justification to enforce liberalization and deregulation (for example, assigning contracts 
without competition). As usual, this opens the way to infiltration by mafia firms through 
subcontracts (allegedly, in this case, related to Sicilian Cosa Nostra); but also it results in a 
dramatic draining of public funds: corruption produced at least 25 million euros of black 
funds, and inflated the project costs from 1.8 billion euros forecast in 2002 to 5.2 billion 
financed in 2014 (Della Porta, Sberna and Vannucci 2015, 218-222; Barbieri and Giavazzi 
2014). 
The second example is EXPO 2015, in Milan. It may appear superfluous to once again 
mention the involvement in the investigations of all the main actors responsible for 
organizing the event: the top managers in the public companies, the private corporations that 
won the tenders, and the politicians at a local and national level. What is worth noting, in this 
case, is that this particular scandal forced the government to create a new authority – the 
ANAC (Autorità Nazionale Anticorruzione, National anti-corruption authority) – which 
introduced new and more severe procedures and controls (ANAC 2015). As a result of these 
controls, by December 3, 2014 the authorities had barred 46 companies which had already 
won contracts or subcontracts related to EXPO 2015, thanks to their relationships with 
mafias: 11 were registered in Southern Italian regions, 35 in Northern regions and, among all 
of them, 32 were infiltrated by ’Ndrangheta. Most of these companies, specializing in road 
infrastructure, had won orders of less than 150,000 euros, the limit below which no control 
was necessary under the old procedures (DNA 2015, 310-311). 
The third and last case in point was named “Mafia Capitale” by the prosecutors, and the 
trial has been underway since the end of 2015. The operation led to the arrest of 36 people, 
while another 101 have been investigated – among them, a former Mayor of the city of 
Rome, Gianni Alemanno, and politicians from different parties in charge both in the City 
Council and in the Region. They were charged with extortion, usury, corruption, money 
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laundering, and many other crimes. Eventually, on November 1, 2015, the Mayor-in-charge, 
Ignazio Marino, was forced to resign, and a special government commissioner took over his 
post. Mafia Capitale prefigures a new paradigm in the category of an institutionalized 
criminal political complex. “Middle Earth,” to use the metaphor adopted by the main boss, 
Massimo Carminati, connects the criminal milieu with the political and economic systems. 
First of all, from the point of view of the range of activities involved, the group was capable 
of managing illicit markets, in the meantime gaining a monopoly in the municipality’s public 
contracts for migrant and refugee shelters and Roma camps (which also means infiltrating 
and compromising the non-profit sector). Secondly, the scheme encompassed a wide swath of 
the criminal environment, ranging from former members of neofascist terrorist group 
(Carminati, had been an activist of Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari – Revolutionary Armed 
Nuclei – or NAR) to the Banda della Magliana, an infamous criminal group operating in 
Rome and Lazio since the end of the 1970s (Flamini 2012) to the Casamonica Roma clan, to 
members of traditional mafia brands (Camorra, Cosa Nostra, and ’Ndrangheta). Finally, and 
most importantly, for the first time in Italy prosecutors were charging people who were not 
connected to the traditional mafia universe with the crime of mafia association (an accusation 
that has yet to be confirmed in the ongoing trial). Until recently, Rome’s criminal 
environment had been characterized by a high level of fluidity, even though it had already 
produced a certain number of charismatic criminal leaders. The situation evolved and 
produced this specific model of a mafia group, with strong powers of intimidation, a broad-
reaching yet shared control of the territory, and easy intimacy with politicians, officials, 
professionals, and entrepreneurs (Savatteri and Grignetti 2015). 
 
Conclusion: Italy as a “Real Democracy” 
In the twentieth century, “Real Socialism” was a successful political concept created by 
the leaders of USSR to distinguish their practice of government from abstract socialist ideas – 
we could say now, after the events of 1989, that they wished to be set free from the theories 
and no longer to have to account for their failures, starting with the constant presence of 
economic shortages (Lebowitz 2012). Italy could be proposed as a Real Democracy, because 
it increasingly drifts away from any theoretical definition of democracy, apart from the 
formal respect of the institutional rules of the game. This results in a growing and peculiar 
shortage regarding the redistribution of resources, from rights to incomes. Italy and Russia 
share eighth place in the classification of the world’s most industrialized countries (based on 
GDP); however, Italy is ranked 48th in the World Happiness Report (2017) published by the 
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United Nations; it is ranked 62th in terms of Freedom of the Press and described as “partly 
free” in the Freedom House classification (2017); it is ranked 60th in the Transparency 
International classification (2016) that measures the perception of the degree of the country’s 
corruption.14 Finally, “between 2008 and 2013 national income fell by 9 per cent, per capita 
incomes by 11 per cent, and industrial production by 25 per cent; and unemployment 
doubled” (Ciccarone and Saltari 2015, 228). It seems plausible, then, to propose Italy as a 
paradigm. As a Real Democracy, it epitomizes, at best, a “third way” – between democracy 
and authoritarianism, North and South, development and underdevelopment. 
Since 1992, in particular, Italy has evolved as a consociational mafia-owned democracy, 
based on cooperative attitudes and behavioural patterns observed between the leaders of the 
various groups involved – mafiosi, politicians, and entrepreneurs (Lijphart 1977).15 Italy, in 
fact, has exhibited this consociational approach since the aftermath of World War II and the 
building of the Republic, though in a peculiar mode. In this early phase, “clientelism 
managed domestic consent in a segmented society and buffered the effects of the necessary 
opening to the European and wider international system” (Guzzini 1995, 31). Later, in the 
1970s and 1980s, the escalation of a patronage-based system of distribution produced the 
figure of “the ‘business politician’, who link[ed] private business and traditional political 
mediation with a trustworthy and personal network of persons willing to act illegally” 
(Guzzini 1995, 35). Finally, following the end of the First Republic, the mafias took the lead 
in the patronage system of corruption, thanks to their clan structure, advancing a peculiar 
interpretation of neoliberal politics: the Italian way to politics and market. In actual fact, the 
clan can attribute structure and permanence to the networks of clientelism, even after the 
business politician has faded. With growing success, the clan claims to replace the state in the 
essential functions relative to the redistribution of resources and the protection of rights, 
thereby definitively subtracting these reserves and systems from any possibility of control or 
supervision by public opinion. The worst part is that the clan is also in a position to impose 
its will and defend its interests against anyone who expresses even minimal opposition, 
simply by deploying the coercive means at its disposal. 
Any attempt to overturn this trend would imply the end of the hegemony of the political 
society, and the formation of a real Second Republic, based on the capacity of collective 
mobilization. However, this also implies a huge investment in education, to build and 
consolidate the awareness of what democratic citizenship really means. 
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Notes 
 
1 “The legality of a judicial system lies in the population’s de facto acceptance of the laws applied to 
their everyday lives [...]. Indifference on the part of the subject to the judicial system law, therefore, 
highlights the real crisis in the legality of the judicial systems: Indifference to law and to punishment 
– punishment conceived as an accidental event and not as something that can be avoided by adapting 
one’s behavior to comply with the rules” (Farneti 1994, 47). 
2 A power is legitimate only when it is juridically founded; a power is legal when applied according to 
the legislation: “the opposite of legitimate power is de facto power; the opposite of legal power is 
arbitrary power” (Bobbio 1979, 580). 
3 These data are inferred by the lists of names compiled by some of the anti-mafia associations and the 
Italian Association for the Victims of Terrorism, as official government statistics are still not 
available. The state massacres are as follows: Piazza Fontana, Milan, 1969; Freccia del Sud train 
derailment, Gioia Tauro, 1970; Peteano, 1972; Police headquarters (Questura), Milan, 1973; Italicus 
train, San Benedetto Val di Sangro (BO), 1974; Piazza della Loggia, Brescia, 1974; Railway station, 
Bologna, 1980; Rapido 904, San Benedetto Val di Sambro (BO), 1984. 
4 Terrorists killed also a former Mayor of Florence, and two members of Regional Council. 
5 The quantitative comparison also leaves no doubt about how anomalous the Italian situation really 
was. The Rote Armee Fraktion killed 34 people in Germany over a period of 22 years; Eta in Spain 
killed 822 people over a period of 40 years; the “Troubles” or the 30-year conflict in Northern Ireland 
involving the IRA and Protestant paramilitaries caused more than 3000 victims among the various 
factions involved. The number of fatalities does not differ greatly from the total number of deaths at 
the hands of the mafia in Italy over the same period, particularly if we include the victims of in-
fighting among the clans. 
6 This fact cannot be underestimated, in my opinion. The Mafia seems accustomed to delayed 
vengeance – as was the case for Giovanni Falcone, killed in 1992, when he was no longer a 
prosecutor in Palermo – but not to preventive strikes. Dalla Chiesa, who had been a protagonist in the 
fight against terrorism, was not even given time to qualify himself as an enemy of Cosa Nostra. When 
he changed his role, it appeared that he also abruptly lost the credentials and the status that state 
institutions had granted him throughout the war on terrorism: the powers and resources assigned to 
him were not even remotely comparable. Dalla Chiesa was delegitimized, abandoned by the same 
institutions, offering mafia an irresistible chance to gain political credits through his killing. 
7 The Mafia was involved, for example, in two of the events listed before: Freccia del Sud train 
derailment, Gioia Tauro, 1970; and Rapido 904, San Benedetto Val di Sambro (BO), 1984. 
8 In fact, this point was not questionable at all: Falcone and Borsellino had been killed, and this 
unquestionably represents an irrefutable defeat for Italian democracy. 
9 It is worth noting that even if no one opposed the idea that 1992 was a turning point in Italian 
history, greater discussion has been given to the assumption that this change gave rise to a new 
Republic: “The 1994-96 legislature did not mark the beginning of a ‘Second Republic’, a term coined 
by journalists that is constitutionally inaccurate. [...] What it did introduce [...] is a second political 
party system” (Ceccanti 2015, 205). 
10 “A clan is an informal organization comprising a network of individuals linked by kin and fictive 
kin identities. [...] Clan ties are neither exotic and primordial, nor inherently negative or 
undemocratic: they are networks based on the rational calculations of individuals [...]; more important 
than the objective reality of kinship is the subjective sense of identity and the use of the norms of 
kinship – such as in-group reciprocity and loyalty – to bind the group and protect its members” 
(Collins 2006, 17). 
11 For a previous, and analogous attempt at a classification of the relationships between mafia and 
entrepreneurs, see Sciarrone (2009). 
12 Elaborating the data of the Agenzia Nazionale dei Beni Sequestrati e Confiscati alla Criminalità 
Organizzata, (CROSS 2015a) made a list of 96 municipalities with less than 5,000 inhabitants; and of 
68 municipalities with between 5,000 and 10,000 inhabitants, in six different Northern regions, where 
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law enforcement agencies seized properties linked to ’Ndrangheta members. 
13 It is worth remembering at least two of the biggest investigative operations of the last years: in the 
first one (2010), named Crimine Infinito (Endless Crime) in Lombardy, 161 people were arrested; in 
the second (2012), named Minotauro, in Piedmont, 148 people were jailed and 9 “locali” 
(institutionalized ’Ndrangheta clans) were discovered in the metropolitan suburbs of Turin (CROSS 
2015a; DNA 2015). 
14 These results are far from positive. In these classifications, France is positioned 25th, 33rd and 26th 
respectively; Germany 26th, 18th and 12th respectively; United Kingdom 22nd, 36th and 14th 
respectively. Russia, Italy’s direct competitor in terms of wealth, was ranked 68th, 176th and 136th 
respectively. 
15 I agree that “the Italian system never corresponded to the ideal-type of consociational democracy 
[...]. Nonetheless, theories of consociationalism offer a good starting point to understand 
developments in Italy” (Guzzini 1995, 30). 
 
References 
Allum, Felia and Stan Gilmour. 2012. Routledge Handbook of Transnational Organized 
Crime. London: Routledge. 
Allum, Felia and Renate Siebert, eds. 2003. Organized Crime and the Challenge to 
Democracy. London: Routledge. 
Amatori, Franco. 2011. Entrepreneurial Typologies in the History of Industrial Italy: 
Reconsiderations. Business History Review, 85:1, 151-180. 
ANAC (Autorità Nazionale Anticorruzione). 2015. Relazione annuale 2014. Rome: Camera 
dei Deputati. 
Anderson, Perry. 2014. The Italian Disaster. London Review of Books. 36:10, 3-16. 
Arendt, Hannah. 1972. Lying in Politics: Reflections on the Pentagon Papers, in Crises of the 
Republic, Hannah Arendt. New York, NY: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1-48. 
Armao, Fabio. 2000. Il sistema mafia. Dall’economia-mondo al dominio locale. Turin: 
Bollati Boringhieri. 
Armao, Fabio. 2003. Why is Organized Crime So Successful?, in Organized Crime and the 
Challenge to Democracy, Felia Allum and Renate Siebert, eds. London: Routledge, 27-38. 
Armao, Fabio. 2014. Criminal Clusters: State and Organized Crime in a Globalised World. 
The European Review of Organised Crime, 1:1, 122-136. 
Armao, Fabio. 2015. Mafia-Owned Democracies. Italy and Mexico as Patterns of Criminal 
Neoliberalism. Tiempo Devorado, 2:1, 4-21. 
Armao, Fabio. 2016. Back to the Clan: Organized Crime as State Surrogate for the Market, in 
Non-State Challenges in a Re-Ordered World. The Jackals of Westphalia, Stefano Ruzza, 
Anja P. Jakobi and Charles Geisler, eds. New York, NY: Routledge, 17-31. 
Barbieri, Giorgio and Francesco Giavazzi. 2014. Corruzione a norma di legge. La lobby delle 
grandi opere che affonda l’Italia. Milan: Rizzoli. 
Barca, Fabrizio, ed. 2010. Storia del capitalismo italiano. Rome: Donzelli. 
Battilani, Patrizia and Francesca Fauri. 2014. L’economia italiana dal 1945 a oggi. Bologna: 
il Mulino. 
Berta, Giuseppe. 2015. La via del Nord. Dal miracolo economico alla stagnazione. Bologna: 
il Mulino. 
Bobbio, Norberto. 1979. Legalità, in Dizionario di Politica, Norberto Bobbio, Nicola 
Matteucci and Gianfranco Pasquino, eds. Turin: UTET. 
 20 
Bonanate, Luigi. 1979. Dimensioni del terrorismo politico. Milan: Franco Angeli. 
Campana, Paolo. 2011. Eavesdropping on the Mob: The Functional Diversification of Mafia 
Activities Across Territories. European Journal of Criminology, 8:3, 213-228. 
Ceccanti, Stefano. 2015. Constitutional Change: An Explanation. Journal of Modern Italian 
Studies, 20:2, 202-212. 
Ciccarone, Giuseppe and Enrico Saltari. 2015. Cyclical Downturn or Structural Disease? The 
Decline of the Italian Economy in the Last Twenty Years. Journal of Modern Italian 
Studies, 20:2, 228-244. 
Ciconte, Enzo. 1992. ’Ndrangheta dall’Unità a oggi. Rome-Bari: Laterza. 
Ciconte, Enzo. 2010. ’Ndrangheta padana. Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino. 
Collins, Kathleen. 2006. Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Crainz, Guido. 2005. Il paese mancato. Dal miracolo italiano agli anni ottanta. Rome: 
Donzelli. 
Crainz, Guido. 2013. Il paese reale. Dall’assassinio di Moro all’Italia di oggi. Rome: 
Donzelli. 
Crainz, Guido. 2015. Italy’s Political System Since 1989. Journal of Modern Italian Studies, 
20:2, 176-188. 
CROSS (Osservatorio sulla Criminalità Organizzata). 2015a. Primo rapporto trimestrale 
sulle aree settentrionali per la Presidenza della Commissione parlamentare di inchiesta 
sul fenomeno mafioso. Università degli Studi di Milano. 
CROSS (Osservatorio sulla Criminalità Organizzata). 2015b. Secondo rapporto trimestrale 
sulle aree settentrionali per la Presidenza della Commissione parlamentare di inchiesta 
sul fenomeno mafioso. Università degli Studi di Milano. 
CROSS (Osservatorio sulla Criminalità Organizzata). 2015c. Terzo rapporto trimestrale sulle 
aree settentrionali per la Presidenza della Commissione parlamentare di inchiesta sul 
fenomeno mafioso. Università degli Studi di Milano. 
Dalla Chiesa, Nando. 2015. L’espansione delle organizzazioni mafiose. Il Nord-Ovest come 
paradigma, in Riconoscere le mafie. Cosa sono, come funzionano, come si muovono, 
Marco Santoro, ed. Bologna: il Mulino, 241-265. 
Della Porta, Donatella. 1992. Lo scambio occulto. Casi di corruzione politica in Italia. 
Bologna: il Mulino. 
Della Porta, Donatella and Alberto Vannucci. 1999. Corrupt Exchanges. Actors, Resources, 
and Mechanism of Political Corruption. New York, NY: Aldine de Gruyter. 
Della Porta, Donatella, Salvatore Sberna and Alberto Vannucci. 2015. Corruzione centripeta 
e centriguga nella post-democrazia italiana, in Politica in Italia. I fatti dell’anno e le 
interpretazioni, Chris Hanretty and Stefania Profeti, eds. Bologna: il Mulino, 215-233. 
Diamanti, Ilvo. 2008. 1992. Tangentopoli. Rome-Bari: Laterza. 
Dino, Alessandra. 2011. Gli ultimi padrini. Indagine sul governo di Cosa Nostra. Rome-Bari: 
Laterza. 
DNA (Direzione Nazionale Antimafia). 2015. Relazione annuale 2014. 
Farneti, Paolo. 1994. Lineamenti di Scienza politica. Milan: Franco Angeli. 
Felice, Emanuele. 2013. Perché il Sud è rimasto indietro. Bologna: il Mulino. 
Felice, Emanuele. 2015. Ascesa e declino. Storia economica d’Italia. Bologna: il Mulino. 
Flamini, Gianni. 2012. La banda della Magliana. Storia di una holding politico-criminale. 
Milan: Kaos. 
 21 
Forgione, Francesco. 2009. Mafia export: come ’Ndrangheta, Cosa Nostra e Camorra hanno 
colonizzato il mondo. Milano: Baldini Castoldi Dalai. 
Freedom House. 2017. https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FOTP_2017_booklet_ 
FINAL_April28.pdf. 
Gambetta, Diego. 1993. The Sicilian Mafia. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Gilpin, Robert. 1987. The Political Economy of International Relations. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
Ginsborg, Paul. 2003. Italy and Its Discontents. Family, Civil Society, State, 1980-2001. New 
York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Ginsborg, Paul and Enrica Asquer, eds. 2011. Berlusconismo. Analisi di un sistema di potere, 
Rome-Bari: Laterza. 
Gounev, Philip and Vincenzo Ruggiero, eds. 2012. Corruption and Organized Crime in 
Europe. Illegal Partnerships. New York, NY: Routledge. 
Graziani, Augusto. 2000. Lo sviluppo dell’economia italiana. Dalla ricostruzione alla 
moneta europea. Turin: Bollati Boringhieri. 
Guzzini, Stefano. 1995. The “Long Night of the First Republic”: Years of Clientelistic 
Implosion in Italy. Review of International Political Economy, 2:1, 27-61. 
Hanretty, Chris and Stefania Profeti, eds. 2015. Politica in Italia. I fatti dell’anno e le 
interpretazioni. Bologna: il Mulino. 
Hirschman, Albert. O. 1970. Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. Responses to Decline in Firms, 
Organizations, and States. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Lebowitz, Michael. A. 2012. The Contradictions of Real Socialism. The Conductor and the 
Conducted. New York, NY: Monthly Review Press. 
Lijphart, Arend. 1977. Democracy in Plural Societies. A Comparative Exploration. Yale 
University Press, CT: New Haven. 
Lupo, Salvatore. 2009. History of the Mafia. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. 
Lupo, Salvatore. 2011. L’unificazione italiana. Mezzogiorno, rivoluzione, guerra civile. 
Rome: Donzelli. 
Macry, Paolo. 2012. Unità a Mezzogiorno. Come l’Italia ha messo assieme i pezzi. Bologna: 
il Mulino. 
Manconi, Luigi. 2008. Terroristi italiani. Le Brigate Rosse e la guerra totale 1970-2008. 
Milan: Rizzoli. 
Morselli, Carlo, ed. 2014. Crime and Networks. New York, NY: Routledge. 
Morselli, Carlo, Mathilde Turcotte and Valentina Tenti. 2011. The Mobility of Criminal 
Groups. Global Crime, 12:2, 165-188. 
Piccio, Daniela. R., Fabrizio Di Mascio and Alessandro Natalini. 2014. Tackling Corruption, 
Finally? How Domestic and Supranational Factors Have Led to Incremental Policy 
Change in Italy, in Corruption in the Contemporary World: Theory, Practice and 
Hotspots, Jonathan Mendilow and Ilan Peleg, eds. Lexington: Rowman and Littlefield, 
173-196. 
Pizzorno, Alessandro. 1992. Introduzione: La corruzione nel sistema politico, in Lo scambio 
occulto. Casi di corruzione politica in Italia, Donatella Della Porta. Bologna: il Mulino, 
13-74. 
Rokkan, Stein. 1999. State Formation, Nation-Building, and Mass Politics in Europe. The 
Theory of Stein Rokkan. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Rossi, Giampiero. 2015. La regola. Giorno per giorno la ’Ndrangheta in Lombardia. Rome-
 22 
Bari: Laterza. 
Ruggiero, Vincenzo. 2012. Italy: Who Corrupts Whom?, in Corruption and Organized Crime 
in Europe. Illegal Partnerships, Philip Gounev and Vincenzo Ruggiero, eds. New York, 
NY: Routledge, 144-160. 
Santoro, Marco, ed. 2015. Riconoscere le mafie. Cosa sono, come funzionano, come si 
muovono. Bologna: il Mulino. 
Savatteri, Gaetano and Francesco Grignetti, eds. 2015. Mafia Capitale. L’atto di accusa della 
Procura di Roma. Milan: Melampo. 
Sciarrone, Rocco. 2009. Mafie vecchie, mafie nuove. Radicamento ed espansione. Rome: 
Donzelli. 
Sciarrone, Rocco, ed. 2011. Alleanze nell’ombra. Mafie ed economie locali in Sicilia e nel 
Mezzogiorno. Rome: Donzelli. 
Sciarrone, Rocco, ed. 2014. Mafie del Nord. Strategie criminali e contesti locali. Rome: 
Donzelli. 
Silj, Alessandro. 1994. Malpaese. Criminalità, corruzione e politica nell’Italia della prima 
Repubblica. 1943-1994. Rome: Donzelli. 
Stajano, Corrado. 1991. Un eroe borghese. Il caso dell’avvocato Giorgio Ambrosoli 
assassinato dalla mafia politica. Turin: Einaudi. 
Strange, Susan. 1986. Casino Capitalism. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Strange, Susan. 1996. The Retreat of the State. The Diffusion of Power in World Economy. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Tarrow, Sidney. 1979. Aspetti della crisi italiana: note introduttive, in La crisi italiana, vol. I, 
Formazione del regime repubblicano e società civile, Luigi Graziano and Sidney Tarrow, 
eds. Turin: Einaudi, 3-40. 
Tilly, Charles. 1975. Reflections on the History of the European State Making, in The 
Formation of National States in Western Europe, Charles Tilly, ed. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 3-83. 
Tilly, Charles. 1985. War Making and State Making as Organized Crime, in Bringing the 
State Back In, Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol, eds. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 169-191. 
Tilly, Charles. 2007. Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Transparency International. 2016. https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_ 
perceptions_index_2016#table. 
Vannucci, Alberto. 2015. Imperfette simbiosi. Protezione, corruzione, estorsione tra mafia e 
politica, in Riconoscere le mafie. Cosa sono, come funzionano, come si muovono, Marco 
Santoro, ed. Bologna: il Mulino, 125-176. 
Varese, Federico. 2011a. Mafia Movements: A Framework for Understanding the Mobility of 
Mafia Groups. Global Crime, 12:3, 218-231. 
Varese, Federico. 2011b. Mafias on the Move. How Organized Crime Conquers New 
Territories. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
World Happiness Report. 2017. http://worldhappiness.report/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2017 
/03/HR17.pdf. 
 
